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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I apply the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination to the compelled production of personal papers, including
personal diaries. In Part I, 1 give the history and the reasoning behind the
constitutional privilege, including an examination of current trends such as
the Court's ruling in United States v. Hubbell.' In Part 11, I highlight the
scope of the privilege and the way it works in practice: Who can claim it
and what the requirements are for a successful claim. In Part 111, I discuss
the privilege as it applies to personal papers, including diaries. I conclude
by expressing the view that the privilege should operate to protect personal
papers and diaries from compelled production without a grant of immunity.

1.

Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
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I.

HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION

A.
DRAFTING THE PRIVILEGE: FROM ENGLISH COMMON LAW TO THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION

The government has a long standing right to compel testimony.2 The
Fifth Amendment gives the privilege (arguably a right) 3 against selfincrimination by declaring that "no person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."'4 This privilege can be traced
to ancient Jewish legal tradition. 5 It has a long history in the English
common law. 6 The Anglo-American tradition has been "accusatorial as
opposed to []inquisitorial ... since it freed itself from practices borrowed
by the Star Chamber from the Continent.",7 Although there was not

Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain
2.
Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1992).
3.
Id. at 1012 n.11: The protection against compelled self-incrimination is
customarily referred to as a "privilege." One court, relying on Wigmore, has called it a
"portmanteau concept," embodying a number of common-law privileges. State v.
McKenzie, 17 Md. App. 563, 578-79 n.8A, 303 A.2d 406, 414-15 n.8A (1973). But see
Leonard W. Levy, Origins Of The Fifth Amendment, XV (2d ed. 1986) ("Although the legal
profession customarily refers to the right against self-incrimination as a 'privilege,' I call it a
'right' because it is one."). Levy claims that by incorporating the common-law privilege into
the Fifth Amendment, the framers transformed the privilege into a right. Id.
U.S. Const., amend. V.; See also Daniel E. Will, Note, "DearDiary- Can You
4.
be Used Against Me?": The Fifth Amendment and Diaries, 35 B.C. L. REV. 965, 969-970
(1994):
During the legislative session of the First Congress in 1789,
Representative James Madison introduced the Fifth Amendment,
including the Self-incrimination Clause, as one of several amendments
he wished to propose to the states for ratification. The First Congress
ultimately included the Fifth Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights
proposed to the states on September 25, 1789. The states completed
ratification by December 15, 1791.
5.
See Levy, supra note 3, at 433-41. See generally Irene Merker Rosenberg and
Yale L. Rosenberg, In The Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 956 (1998) ("In this Article we contrast the American privilege against
self-incrimination with the cognate Talmudic principle that no man may render himself an
evil person.").
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). See generally Levy, supra note 3;
6.
MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFIH 1-23, 235-38 (1980) (for an extensive and thorough
account of the historical development of the Fifth Amendment).
7.
Michael Edmund O'Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting the
Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2466 (2002) (citing
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extensive legislative debate on the privilege,8 the Framers undoubtedly
intended to foster a tension between the government's power to compel
"every man's evidence" 9 and the individual right to refuse incriminating

questions.' 0 This is why, in America, "society carries the burden of proving
its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth."'"
B.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT: BOYD V. UNITED STATES PROTECTED PERSONAL
PAPERS

The Court first used the privilege to limit a prosecutor's power in
Boyd v. United States.12 In Boyd, the government accused Boyd of failing
to pay proper import duties on thirty-five cases of plate glass. 3 The
government obtained a court order requiring Boyd to produce his shipping
invoice for this glass. 14 Boyd complied with the court order because a
failure to produce the invoice, under a statute in effect at the time, has been
treated as a confession to the government's charges.' 5 The governmentt6
then used the compelled invoice Boyd provided to prove Boyd's guilt.
Boyd appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that the

Watts, 338 U.S. at 54).
8.
See, e.g., Daniel E. Will, Note, "DearDiary - Can You be Used Against Me?":
The Fifth Amendment and Diaries,35 B.C. L. REV. 965, 970 (1994) ("Sparse congressional
debate over adoption of the Self-incrimination Clause in America, however, left unclear
whether the First Congress simply embraced the same policies that prompted the
development of the self-incrimination concept in England, or sought additional safeguards
with the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.") (citing 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2251, at 324-25 (1961)).
9.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that constitutional,
common-law, and statutory privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence [and] are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation
of the search for truth.").
10.
Murphy, supra note 2, at 1050 ("[Tlhe fundamental public policy debate ...
[on] the Fifth Amendment [is]-how to balance the government's interest in attaining the
truth and the individual's protection against compelled self-incrimination.").
11.
See O'Neill, supra note 7. Murphy, supra note 2, at 1050.
12.
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PrHT. L. REV. 27, 39 (1986) ("Boyd was also the
Supreme Court's first significant case involving the fourth amendment or the fifth
amendment privilege.").
13.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617.
14.
Id. at 618.
15.
Id. at 620.
16.
Id. at 618.
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this production violated his privilege against selfstatute that compelled
7
incrimination. 1
The Boyd Court found that the statute which authorized this seizure by
the government went even further than "the obnoxious writs of
assistance. ' ' 8 The Court described the writs of assistance as "the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book" because the writs "placed the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer." 19 The Boyd Court stated that "the court attempts to
extort from the party his private books and papers to make him liable for a
penalty or to forfeit his property. 2 ° Such action violated the Constitution
because "[p]apers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear
an inspection. 21 Citing landmark English cases on the importance of
personal privacy, the Boyd Court held that compulsory production of
these private papers and books violated the privilege against selfincrimination because: "It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to
accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation,
falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and
unjust; and it would seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the

17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 622-23:
The act of 1863 was the first act in this country, and, we might say,
either in this country or in England, so far as we have been able to
ascertain, which authorized the search and seizure of a man's private
papers, or the compulsory production of them, for the purpose of using
them in evidence against him in a criminal case, or in a proceeding to
enforce the forfeiture of his property. Even the act under which the
obnoxious writs of assistance were issued did not go as far as this, but
only authorized the examination of ships and vessels, and persons found
therein, for the purpose of finding goods prohibited to be imported or
exported, or on which the duties were not paid, and to enter into and
search any suspected vaults, cellars, or warehouses for such goods. The
search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to
duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different
things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers
for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using
them as evidence against him.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (citing James Otis, 1761, Boston).
19.
20.
Id. at 624.
21.
Id. at 627-28.
22.
Id. at 626 (citing Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, 19
Howell's State Trials, at 1029 (Lord Camden)).
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Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the
same principle.
23
guilty."
Notably, the Boyd Court added that "any compulsory discovery by
extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books
and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to
the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an
Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the
purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom., 24 The Boyd Court, while providing
another memorable quote for civil libertarians, 25 found the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment issues intertwined. 6 Two concurring justices found only a
27
Fifth Amendment violation, disregarding any Fourth Amendment issue.

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629 (citing 19 Howell's State Trials at 1029).
116 U.S. at 631-32.
Id. at 635:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects [sic] their substantial
purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
26.
Id. at 633 ("[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself.").
27.
Id. at 639 (Miller, J., joined by Waite, C.J., concurring):
I am of opinion that this is a criminal case within the meaning of that
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which declares that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."
And I am quite satisfied that the effect of the act of Congress is to
compel the party on whom the order of the court is served to be a
witness against himself. The order of the court under the statute is in
effect a subpoena duces tecum, and, though the penalty for the witness's
failure to appear in court with the criminating papers is not fine and
imprisonment, it is one which may be made more severe, namely, to
have charges against him of a criminal nature, taken for confessed, and
made the foundation of the judgment of the court. That this is within the
protection which the Constitution intended against compelling a person
to be a witness against himself, is, I think, quite clear.
23.
24.
25.
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THE DOCTRINE DEVELOPS: BOYD GETS DISTINGUISHED

Boyd is the beginning of any analysis of the Fifth Amendment
privilege and its relation to the compelled production of personal papers
rather than its end. This is because successive Courts found Boyd
distinguishable by narrowing the application of the protection. In Hale v.
Henkel, the Court held that the privilege is a personal privilege and
therefore a corporation cannot assert it. 28 In Wilson v. United States, the
Court held that a corporate officer cannot refuse to turn over corporate
documents even if the inquiry of the grand jury that issued the subpoena is
focused on the officer personally and not on the corporation. 29 In United
States v. White, the Court held that an unincorporated labor union could not
assert the privilege. 30 The White Court announced a new test to determine
when an organization should be precluded from asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination. 31 Finally, in Bellis v. United States, the Court
held that a partner in a business partnership cannot invoke the privilege in
response to a subpoena duces tecum for partnership business records

because a partnership is not a natural person and that a partner in a
partnership had no expectation of privacy with respect to the financial
records of an organized entity such as his partnership.
Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Anderson are representative entities
and it bears remembering that "private corporations and other types of

organizations do not enjoy the privilege that individuals have from being
compelled by due and lawful process to produce their books and records
for examination. 3 3 When people join together to limit their liability in

28.
29.
30.
31.

201 U.S. 43 (1906).
221 U.S. 361 (1911).
322 U.S. 694 (1944).
Id. at 701:

The test ... is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances
that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal inthe
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody
or represent the purely private or personal interest of its constituents, but
rather to embody their common or group interests only.
32.
417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (Marshall, J.,announcing the opinion of the Court)
("The framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure, who were
interested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended
the privilege to be available to protect economic or other interests of such organizations so
as to nullify appropriate governmental regulations." (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 700)).

33.
Annotation, Right of Member, Officer, Agent, or Director of Private
Corporation or Unincorporated Association to Assert Personal Privilege Against SelfIncriminationwith Respect to Productionof CorporateBooks or Records, 52 A.L.R.3d 636,

639 (2002).
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multi-person partnerships or corporations, the personal privilege against
self-incrimination evaporates.3" And, although the privilege is personal,35 a
person having custody of books or records cannot simply "object to their
production on the ground that their contents might incriminate him
personally." 36 In sum, the privilege "affords no protection against the
subpoena or
production of corporate records and papers in response to a 37
order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction."
LIMITING PERSONAL PRIVACY: SURRENDERING DOCUMENTS TO A
D.
THIRD PARTY RENDERS THE PRIVILEGE MOOT UNDER COUCH V. UNITED
STATES

Nearly three decades ago, personal privacy ostensibly suffered a large
setback with the decision in Fisher v. United States.38 Three years before
Fisher, the Court laid the groundwork when it decided Couch v. United
States.39 The facts in Couch hew closely to those in Fisher.In Couch, the
Internal Revenue Service sought the financial records of Couch, the sole
owner of a restaurant. ° Couch's accountant let an Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) agent inspect these records, but when the IRS agent sought to view
the records again, Couch's accountant refused. 4 ' The IRS agent then
summonsed Couch's records, but upon the return date of the summons,

Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation: Supreme Court's Views as to Application of
34.
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Compulsory Production of
Documents, 48 L. Ed. 2d 852, 869 (1977 & Supp. 1999):
Artificial entities, whether corporations, labor unions, or otherwise, have
been held to have no standing to have asserted on their behalf a Fifth
Amendment claim of privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme
Court having stated in a number of cases, often in the context of the
privilege of one holding such documents in a representative capacity
that an artificial entity cannot plead the Fifth Amendment privilege with
respect to the compulsory production of documents in its possession.
Id. (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21 (1974); Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
35.
Annotation, Right of Member, Officer, Agent, or Director of Private
36.
Corporation or UnincorporatedAssociation to Assert Personal Privilege Against SelfIncriminationwith Respect to Productionof CorporateBooks or Records, 52 A.L.R.3d 636,
639 (2002).
Id.
37.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
38.
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
39.
Id. at 330.
40.
Id. at 324.
41.
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Couch's accountant told the IRS agent that Couch's attorney now had the
records.42 The Couch Court rejected a claim of privilege by Couch, holding
that Couch's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was not
violated because there had been no governmental compulsion and no
reasonable expectation of privacy. 43 The Court reemphasized that the
privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal privilege and that
the privilege is intended to protect against the "extortion of information
from the accused himself' rather than to prevent incriminating evidence
from being produced by a third party. 44 Couch's voluntary surrender of
these documents to a third party for a significant period of time was
sufficient to "disqualify her entirely as an object of any impermissible Fifth
Amendment compulsion. 45 Three years after Couch came Fisher.46 The
FisherCourt's holding "embarked upon a new course of Fifth Amendment
analysis" by making a significant break from Boyd.47
E.
PERSONAL PAPERS REDEFINED: VOLUNTARILY CREATED DOCUMENTS
ARE NOT PROTECTED UNDER FISHER V. UNITED STATES

Fisher narrowed the protection of the privilege and "was a virtually
complete redefinition of what constitutes 'communicative' testimony that is
protected by the Fifth Amendment., 48 Like the Couch Court, the Fisher
Court considered the government's attempt to subpoena personal business
records in a tax evasion case. In Fisher,the Court again rejected the claim
of privilege and required an accountant to produce subpoenaed tax records
held on behalf of a client who was under investigation for tax fraud. 49 The
Fisher Court held that the privilege did not protect these records because
the records were not prepared by the client and, therefore, the client was

42.
Id. at 325.
43.
Id. at 336.
44.
Id. at 328.
45.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1973).
46.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
47.
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
announcing the opinion of the Court).
48.
Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal
Documents After United States v. Hubbell - New Protectionfor Private Papers,29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 123, 143 (2002).
49.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 397 ("The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not
violated by enforcement of the summonses involved in these cases because enforcement
against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything - and certainly
would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself.").
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not in a position to attest to their authenticity. 50 However, the FisherCourt
did not simply agree with the reasoning in Couch, which had held that
records were unprotected from disclosure when a client surrendered them
to a third party for a significant period of time.5 1 Instead, the FisherCourt
declared that the privilege was not intended to protect the content of
voluntarily created documents.5 2 Such documents were created without
government compulsion, therefore the content could not be considered to
contain compelled testimony.53 This was a major break from Boyd, which
created documents could not be seized even under
had held that voluntarily
54
a search warrant.
Contrary to some prosecutors' misapprehensions, 55 the holding in
Fisher did not leave private documents wholly unprotected from
government subpoena. When the Fisher Court "rejected both property
rights and personal privacy as rationales for protection against selfincrimination," the Court then "looked to the text of the Fifth Amendment
and focused on the compulsion of 'testimonial' communications as the
touchstone for self-incrimination analysis., 56 Although private information
contained within voluntarily created documents lacked protection, the
Fisher Court held that "[tihe act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside
from the contents of the papers produced., 57 For example, the FisherCourt
recognized that complying with a subpoena can concede "the existence of
the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer [as
well as] indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in

Id. at 413.
50.
Couch, 409 U.S. at 334-35.
51.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 ("We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment
52.
protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not the [disclosure of] private information."')
(quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
Id. at 409-10 (White, J.)("the preparation of all the papers sought in these cases
53.
was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence,
either of the taxpayers or of anyone else."); But see, id. at 423 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that compulsion does not really relate to the creation of the document but only to the
act of producing the document: "it is the compelled production of testimonial evidence, not
just the compelled creation of such evidence, against which the privilege protects.").
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616 ("When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment,
54.
namely, compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and
seizure of his private papers, it is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the Fourth
Amendment.").
See infra text accompanying note 126.
55.
Cole, supra note 48, at 142-143.
56.
Fisher,425 U.S. at 410.
57.
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the subpoena., 58 If such a concession may have been incriminating, then
the act would still qualify as protected under the privilege because such a
' ' 59
compelled act would qualify as both "'testimonial' and 'incriminating.
Therefore, the Fisher Court developed a test to determine when the
compelled production of documents could implicitly communicate
incriminating facts that existed beyond mere contents, which lacked
protection. The Court held that an act is testimonial if it would: (1) concede
the existence of a document; (2) concede possession, location, or control of
a document; or (3) assist in authentication of a document. 60 Under this test,
if the aforementioned document qualified as incriminating, then any
compelled testimonial act regarding this document would remain protected
by the privilege. In sum, the government could not compel a person to (1)
concede the existence of a potentially incriminating document; (2) concede
possess, location, or control of a potentially incriminating document; or (3)
assist in the authentication of a potentially incriminating document.
F.

INDIVIDUALS MUST PRODUCE THEIR RECORDS: UNITED STATES V. DOE6 '

Fisherinvolved a subpoena to a third-party, not to a client herself. The
Fisher Court expressly declined to decide "whether the Fifth Amendment
would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his
possession. 62 United States v. Doe answered that question in the negative.
In Doe, the sole proprietor of several businesses argued that broad
subpoenas for personal business records should be quashed because of the
privilege. Doe argued that the business records of a sole proprietorship
were no different from the individual owner's personal records.63 Citing
Boyd, Doe principally argued that "the Fifth Amendment should be read as
creating a 'zone of privacy which protects an individual and his personal
records from compelled production.' 64 Second, Doe argued that turning
over subpoenaed documents would admit their existence and authenticity,

58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 410-413.
61.
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1983).
62.
United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976); see also Doe, 465 U.S. at
610 ("The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege protects the contents of an individual's tax records in his
possession.") (footnote omitted).
63.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 608.
64.
Id. at 611, n.8.
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which was impermissible. 65 Doe succeeded at quashing the subpoenas for
records beyond those records "required by law to be kept or disclosed to a
public agency '' 66 up through the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.67 But, Doe lost before the United States Supreme Court,
which held that the contents of an individual's voluntarily prepared
business records are not protected by the privilege even where they are held
by an individual.68
In Doe, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately in a
concurrence "to make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of [Fisher]."
69
Namely, O'Connor wrote that the Fisher Court held that "the Fifth
Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private
papers of any kind."7 ° She declared that the Fisher Court "sounded the
death-knell for Boyd.",7 1 O'Connor was correct: The obiter dictum of the
Boyd Court's majority, where it claimed that the government could not
seize documentary evidence even with a search warrant, had already been
repudiated.7 2 But the Doe Court did not address the propriety of the Boyd
Court's concurrence, which had held that the compelled production of
incriminating documents violated the Fifth Amendment but did not reach
the Fourth Amendment issues.73 In another sense, Boyd may be
anachronistic because although Justice Bradley characterized the suit
against the plates of glass as an in rem proceeding that was criminal in
nature,74 today, such an in rem forfeiture is considered civil, not criminal.
Therefore, the privilege may not apply to protect against such a disclosure

Id. at 608.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 612.
68.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-302 (1967) (overturning the holding in
72.
Boyd that the Government could not, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, obtain "mere
evidence" from the accused.); see also Fisher,425 U.S. at 409 ("To the extent, however,
that the rule against compelling production of private papers rested on the proposition that
seizures of or subpoenas for 'mere evidence,' including documents, violated the Fourth
Amendment and therefore also transgressed the Fifth, the foundations for the rule have been
washed away.") (footnote omitted).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 639 (1886).
73.
74. Id.at 616.
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 278 (1996) ("In rem civil forfeiture is a
75.
remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as
fines, and does not constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
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since it only applies where there is a fear of incriminating oneself in a
criminal prosecution, not in an in rem civil forfeiture action.76
The Fisher Court had warned that authorship alone of a document
with incriminating content did not create a privilege that protected this
content. 77 But when the Fisher Court provided that a document's
incriminating contents 78 cannot alone establish a claim for protection by the
author, the Court had simply made a natural distinction. If the mere fact of
the existence of incriminating information alone could establish the
privilege and prevent the introduction of documentary evidence, then, as
the Boyd majority held, no incriminating documentary evidence authored
by a person could even be seized with a warrant and then used at trial.79
Such a rule would severely stymie the aim of criminal investigation by
preventing criminal prosecution even where the government could
convince an impartial magistrate to issue a search warrant for documents
that implicated a suspect in even the most serious criminal misdeeds,
including those misdeeds very difficult to prove without documentary
evidence, such as forgery or cases involving written threats or written
conspiracies. The Fisher Court rightly recognized this position as
untenable.8 °

76.
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998) (stating that the privilege
against self-incrimination can only be asserted if a "witness reasonably believes that the
information sought, or discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a
subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding.") (emphasis added) (citing Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972)); see also Robert B. Little, Note, United States
v. Ursery and the Abrupt End to the Extension of Double Jeopardy Protectionsto Civil
Forfeitures, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 143, 148-49 (1997) ("Despite the Court's apparent
willingness to recognize the punitive aspect of so-called 'civil' forfeiture in Boyd and the
numerous constitutional challenges that followed, the decision did not herald a great change
in the Court's treatment of forfeiture cases.").
77.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410, n. Il ("The fact that the documents may have been
written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the privilege.") (citing
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 378 (1911)).
78.
Or contents that provide a link in the chain of incrimination.
79.
But, materials obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment may still
be used to secure an indictment. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1992)
(stating grand jury may consider evidence obtained in violation of either Fourth or Fifth
Amendments). Still, if a grant of immunity was required to use incriminating material at
trial, no defendant wise enough to assert her rights would be convicted with her own
documents, regardless of how they were seized.
80.
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407 ("[T]here is no special sanctity in papers, as
distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure,
if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may
be seized .... ") (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921)).
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In sum, the FisherCourt simply explained with their holding that the
production of documents will only fall under the privilege when the
government compels testimonial action regarding this document that may
be incriminating. The Fisher Court did not explicitly overrule the rationale
in Boyd's concurrence. The Fisher Court held that the privilege can be
invoked if the government tries to compel testimony that is brigaded with
incrimination. The FisherCourt held that the production of documents that
may be incriminating is testimonial, and thereby prohibited, where such
production will: (1) concede the existence of a document; (2) concede
possession, location, or control of a document; or (3) assist in the
authentication of a document. 8 1 In Hubbell, the Court reinvigorated the
privilege by clarifying a misconception the government had about what sort
of evidence qualified as testimonial.8 2
II.

A.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
How IT WORKS IN PRACTICE

STARR SET THE STAGE FOR THE PRIVILEGE'S REVIVAL IN HUBBELL V.

UNITED STATES

Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr was "appointed in August of 1994
to investigate possible violations of federal law relating to the Whitewater
Development Corporation." 83 In December of 1994, Starr secured a
cooperation agreement from Webster Hubbell. Hubbell had "pleaded guilty
to charges of mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices
as a member of an Arkansas law firm from 1989 to 1992, and was
sentenced to 21 months in prison., 84 When the prosecution of sitting United
States President Bill Clinton stalled, Starr decided that he wanted to see if
Hubbell had fulfilled his promise to give "'full, complete, accurate, and
truthful information' about matters relating to the Whitewater
investigation." 85 To that end, Starr subpoenaed a broad swath of personal
papers from Hubbell.8 6

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Fisher,425 U.S. at 410-13.
See generally United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46-49.

2004]

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PAPERS AND BOYD

Prosecutors may seek search warrants or subpoenas, at their
discretion. 87 Prosecutors can secure a legitimate search warrant only after
satisfying an independent magistrate that they have met the Fourth
Amendment's particularity and probable cause requirements. 88 With a
search warrant, the government can legally seize documents, including
personal papers such as diaries. 89 But, it is much easier for prosecutors to
simply issue a subpoena, which they can do with just a signature, and ask
these people to bring documents to the grand jury, 90 rather than going
through the more rigorous process of securing search warrants from an
independent magistrate and then finding law enforcement officials to
execute these search warrants.
Although some cases do not lend themselves to the issuance of
subpoenas, where they can be implemented, the subpoena is a more
efficient tool for gathering evidence than the search warrant. And, using the
subpoena power, the government can try to compel a person to produce a
diary or other personal papers, such as Starr did with Hubbell.
Additionally, prosecutors know that the subpoena has the added benefit of
providing another potential charge on which to prosecute the targeted
person. If a person refuses to comply with a lawful subpoena, the
government can pursue criminal contempt charges 9' and seek an
indeterminate fine and jail sentence.92 Further, lying to the court in

87.
H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor:The Obligation of Dispassionin a
PassionatePursuit,68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1705 (2000).
88.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-13 (1964); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
89.
Fisher,425 U.S. at 409.
90.
Or even to the prosecutor's office. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973) (upholding a subpoena requiring the defendant's presence at a federal prosecutor's
office to read transcripts of federal wiretaps into a recorder).
91.
Diana Lowndes, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:III. Trial:
Authority of the Trial Judge, 90 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1675-76 (2002) ("Criminal contempt
sanctions are imposed to vindicate the authority of the court and may be imposed even after
the action in which the contempt arose is terminated."); Paula F. Wolff, Federal District
Court's Power to Impose Sanctions on Non-Partiesfor Abusing Discovery Process, 149
A.L.R. Fed. 589, 599 (1998):
The federal district court may find the power to compel a non-party to
produce documents and things under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
34(c). Under Rule 45(e), which provides that any person's failure to
obey a subpoena without an adequate excuse may be deemed a
contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued, the federal
district court can find any person, including a non-party, in contempt of
court for failure to comply with a subpoena, without objecting to the
subpoena.
92.
Michael J. Yaworsky, Contempt: State Court's Power to Order Indefinite
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response to a subpoena will 94expose a person to criminal perjury,93 as well
as further contempt charges.
In Hubbell, the court ordered Hubbell to produce these documents or
risk contempt.9 5 Facing these potential sanctions, Hubbell sought to quash
the subpoena for his personal records by arguing that the privilege against
self-incrimination protected him from making such broad disclosures
without a grant of immunity.96 Anyone who provides testimony can assert
the privilege, not just targets,97 so it did not matter whether Hubbell was
considered a target or simply a witness. But, even when someone validly
asserts the privilege, the government can still compel production by simply
providing a grant of immunity coextensive to the privilege. The privilege
can be overcome by such a grant of immunity because the privilege against
self-incrimination becomes moot if the government provides immunity
from prosecution. Such immunity becomes "coextensive with the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination '98 because it nullifies any potential
incrimination by removing the danger of prosecution using or deriving
from this compelled testimony. Without a danger of prosecution, there
cannot be an incriminating component to the testimony. The privilege only
protects compelled disclosures that are both testimonial and incriminating.
Thus, when the court gave Hubbell immunity "to the extent provided by
law," Hubbell had to comply and produce the 13,120 pages of requested
documents to the independent counsel or face the potentially dire legal
consequences. 99

Coercive Fine or Imprisonment to Exact Promise of Future Compliance with Court's
Order Anticipatory Contempt, 81 A.L.R.4th 1001, 1008 (2003) ("[C]ontempt consisting of

present, ongoing behavior may be dealt with by an indeterminate fine or term of
imprisonment which continues in effect until the violative behavior ceases; this is a coercive
sanction.").
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (Perjury generally); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (False declarations
93.
before grand jury or court).
J.A. Bock, Perjury or False Swearing as Contempt, 89 A.L.R.2d 1258, 1296
94.
(1963) ("The commission of perjury or false swearing while testifying before a grand jury
has frequently been held or recognized as constituting a contempt of court."). But see In re
Persico, 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1974) (Where purpose of holding person in contempt was to
coerce him to answer grand jury's question and was not to punish him for reprehensible
conduct, he was only recalcitrant witness and his contempt was manifestly civil in character,
to which summary procedure set forth in 28 U.S.C.S. § 1826 was applicable, rather than
procedure for criminal contempt set out in Rule 42 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
95.
United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 1998).
96.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Court's opinion, relying
97.
on prior cases, essentially defines 'witness' as a person who provides testimony.").
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 54.
98.
Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings,No. GJ-9699.
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Testimony is not limited to oral responses to questions under oath. In
Andresen v. Maryland, the Court declared that the privilege against selfincrimination has historically functioned to protect a "'natural individual
from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal
records." ' 00 In Kastigarv. United States, the Court explained that the rule
"protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could
be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
be so used."' 0' The concurrence in Hubbell has an even broader conception
of testimony, one that very well might soon seriously revise and revitalize
the privilege. 0 2 Regardless, the privilege against self-incrimination
operates, in conjunction with the exclusionary rule, 10 3 to prevent the
government from using, at trial, evidence gathered in violation of the
privilege, 4 As the Hubbell Court explained, the privilege also prevents the
government from using evidence gathered
in violation of the privilege as a
05
means to secure evidence to use at trial.1
In Hubbell, the privilege was overcome when the district court granted
Hubbell immunity "to the extent allowed by law," namely immunity under
18 U.S.C. § 6002.106 Three types of immunity exist: use immunity, use and
derivative use immunity, and transactional immunity. 0 7 The latter two
types of immunity are coextensive with the protection guaranteed by the
privilege. 0 8 Use immunity is not.1' 9 Transactional immunity is the most
protective immunity. A grant of transactional immunity means that the

3 (E.D.Ark., W.D. Nov. 14, 1996)).
100.
427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976) (holding that business records are outside the Fifth
Amendment privilege) (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
101.

406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479

102.

See infra Part III (E).

(1951) (holding that a court must find a "real and substantial" risk that the testimony might
expose a witness to criminal liability before upholding a witness's invocation of the
privilege).
103.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (holding that the
exclusionary rule "extends as well to the indirect as the direct products" of unconstitutional
conduct).
104.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) ("Although
conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a
constitutional violation occurs only at trial.") (footnotes omitted). But see O'Neill, supra
note 7 (questioning the applicability of the privilege to Congressional investigations).
105.
See infra Part 11 (B) (1-2).
106.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38.
107.
Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation: Adequacy, Under Federal Constitution, of
Immunity Granted in Lieu of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Supreme Court Cases,
32 L. Ed. 2d 869, 878-80 (1973).

108.
109.

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,457-61 (1972).
See Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
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government cannot prosecute the immunized person on anything that the
person was compelled to disclose to the government pursuant to this
immunization, 0 regardless of whether any independent evidence had
already been collected implicating this person."' Transactional immunity is
rarely given,' 2 particularly after the court found in Kastigar that use and
derivative use immunity was coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination and thus was the lowest level of immunity that must be
provided before the government can compel incriminating testimony from
a person.' 13 With use and derivative use immunity, a person cannot be
prosecuted using the compelled testimony itself or the fruits of the
compelled testimony. 1 4 The Court allows the government to prosecute
people who had been given use and derivative use immunity if the
government can prove that the trial evidence consists only of evidence
gained independent of the testimony compelled due to the immunization." 5

See e.g. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 451-52 (1972); see also Brown
110.
v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 43, 46 (1959) (holding it has "become part of the
constitutional fabric" that a witness could not exercise the privilege after being granted
"immunity from prosecution coextensive with the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.").
111.
John van Loben Sels, From Watergate to Whitewater: Congressional Use
Immunity and Its Impact on the Independent Counsel, 83 GEO. L.J. 2385, 2388 (1995) ("[A]
mobster testifying under a grant of transactional immunity about his own role in multiple
slayings could not subsequently be prosecuted for any of those murders regardless of the
type or quantity of independent evidence of his guilt.").
That is why it was surprising that Jacob Stein and Plato Cacheris secured
112.
transactional immunity for their client Monica Lewinsky from Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr when she agreed to testify about her relationship with President Clinton. See
Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Lewinsky Gets Immunity for Her Testimony; Sources Say ExIntern to Tell of Clinton Bid to Hide Affair, WASH. POST, July 29, 1998, at Al; Ruth
Marcus, Immunity Coverage is Extensive, Lying to Grand Jury Is Only Exception, WASH.
POST, July 29, 1998, at A8.
See, e.g., Balsys, 524 U.S. at 692 ("If the Government is ready to provide the
113.
requisite use and derivative use immunity, see Kastigar,406 U.S. at 453; see also Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973), the protection goes no further: no violation of personality
is recognized and no claim of privilege will avail."); see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State
Conm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 475 (1972)
Appellant contends that only full transactional immunity affords
protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege and
suffices to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. We rejected
this argument today in Kastigar,where we held that immunity from use
and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege, and is
therefore sufficient to compel testimony.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 n.3 (1967) ("Because he was
114.
compelled to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity . . . it is clear that the fruit of his
testimony cannot be used against him in any future trial.") (citation omitted).
115.
United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
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To prove that this evidence used in a prosecution was gained
all the
independently, the government will sometimes provide, in camera,
6
information they currently have before they give use immunity."1
The government did not proceed against Hubbell after filing away the
independent evidence because in Hubbell, no independent evidence had
been gathered."' Starr admitted that he had no case before Hubbell turned
over the requested documents." 18 Yet, within these documents provided by
Hubbell, Starr found evidence of tax evasion and fraud that had previously
been unknown to him."19 Starr then secured a "10-count indictment
charging [Hubbell] with various tax-related crimes and mail and wire

(Holding that "[w]hen the government proceeds to prosecute a previously immunized
witness, it has 'the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
derived from legitimate independent sources."') (citing Kastigar,406 U.S. at 461-62); see
also Raja Mishra & Katherine Shaver, Immunity for Tripp Wiretap Attacked: Judge to Issue
Key Ruling Today on Use of Tapes, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1999, at B I (Linda Tripp
received use and derived use immunity from Starr in return for furnishing the tape-recorded
conversations she had with Monica Lewinsky, but the State of Maryland nonetheless
prosecuted Tripp using independent evidence.); Ray Suarez, GrantingImmunity, with Guest
Sam Dash, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, July 8, 1997, Dash:
[t]he difference between transactional immunity and use immunity is
that in use immunity you are protected against anybody using, directly
or indirectly, the testimony you give, but you still can be prosecuted on
the basis of independent evidence-independent from your testimony
...we did that in Watergate with John Dean and Jeb Magruder.
116.
Morton Rosenberg, Specialistin American Public Law CongressionalResearch
Service House Government Reform Paperwork Reduction, Congressional Testimony, April
12, 2000, 2000 WL 489067 (F.D.C.H.):
[With transactional immunity,] neither the immunized testimony that the
witness gives to the committee, nor information derived from that
testimony, may be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, except one for falsely testifying to the committee or for
contempt. However, he may be convicted of the crime (the
"transaction") on the basis of evidence independently obtained by the
prosecution and sealed before his congressional testimony, and/or on the
basis of information obtained after his congressional appearance but
which was not derived, either directly or indirectly, from his
congressional testimony.
117.
See generally Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
118.
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, counsel representing the Office of
Independent Counsel Starr acknowledged that "we absolutely did not know about the
contents of the documents" and the Court was "absolutely right" in its understanding that it
was only by virtue of the production of documents that the prosecutors learned the facts that
enabled them to prosecute Hubbell. 2000 WL 230520, at 3 (Transcript of Supreme Court
Oral Argument).
119.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (The Government did not show that "it had any prior
knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents
ultimately produced by respondent.").
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fraud." 120 Hubbell responded to this indictment by claiming that the
evidence against him was derived from the testimony compelled by a grant
of immunity and that Starr had violated the immunity agreement by using
this evidence against him. 12 1 Starr replied that he only had to give Hubbell
act-of-production immunity, or immunity only for the explicit act of
production. 22 Starr claimed that he complied with the immunity statute
because he would not introduce into evidence any document provided by
Hubbell during his upcoming trial. 23 The United States district court
reviewing this matter declared that the "independent counsel's central
argument ... may be characterized as 'no problem as long as the finder of
fact never learns who produced the documents.""1 24 In sum, Starr argued
that he could use the incriminating information gleaned from Hubbell's
compelled disclosures as long as he did not introduce Hubbell's actual
preferred "manna
response to the subpoenas. 25 This is the government's
26
1
disclosure.
compelled
of
treatment
from heaven"
B.

THE HUBBELL COURT REINVIGORATES THE PRIVILEGE

1.

'Mannafrom Heaven Approach' Starved of Justification

Until the ruling in Hubbell, some prosecutors believed that the
privilege against self-incrimination could be protected by treating
compelled evidence as if it had "magically appeared in grand jury room,"
' 28
27
like manna from heaven. This "long advocated government position" 1

Id. at 31.
120.
Hubbell, I1 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
121.
122.
Id. at 35.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.; see also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41 ("[tlhe Government disclaims any need to
introduce any of the documents produced by respondent into evidence in order to prove the
charges against him. It follows, according to the Government, that it has no intention of
making improper 'use' of respondent's compelled testimony.").
125.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41 (Affirming as obvious that "the response to the
subpoena may be introduced into evidence at his criminal trial. That would surely be a
prohibited 'use' of the immunized act of production.") (citing In re Sealed Case, 791 F.2d
179, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
Robert P. Mosteller, Article, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for
126.
IncriminatingEvidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 514 (2001).
Id. at 513, n.119.
127.
128.
Id. at 513.
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was soundly rejected by the Hubbell Court.129 The Court agreed that

introducing "the response to the subpoena . . . at his criminal trial . ' . 3.

10
would surely be a prohibited 'use' of the immunized act of production.'
But the Court lambasted the government, declaring that the "anemic view
of respondent's act of production as a mere physical act that is principally
non-testimonial in character. . . can be entirely divorced from its 'implicit'
testimonial aspect. '1' The Hubbell Court, with only one dissenter, 32 held
that the privilege prevented the government from using evidence derived
from the compelled production of personal documents under a grant of
immunity. 133
The Hubbell Court emphasized that the privilege prevented fishing
expeditions such as Starr's second prosecution of Hubbell based on his
compelled disclosures. 134 The Court found it "apparent from the text of the
subpoena itself that the prosecutor needed [Hubbell's] assistance both to
35
identify potential sources of information and to produce those sources.",
Hubbell had been compelled to answer the subpoena, in a manner
36
suspiciously like the requirement of answering civil interrogatories.1
Therefore, the Hubbell Court found that Hubbell had been compelled to
produce evidence that "could provide a prosecutor with a 'lead to
incriminating evidence,' or 'a link in the chain of evidence needed to

530 U.S. at 31 (Webster Hubbell objected to the government's use of
129.
information from documents he turned over after being granted immunity "to the extent
allowed by law.").
130.
Id. at 41.
Id. at43.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
530 U.S. at 44-45 (The Court "rejected the government's attempt to limit use-

134.

Id. at 32 (approvingly noting that "the District Court characterized the subpoena

immunity to direct uses by the prosecution of the communicative aspects of the act of
production and never to the contents.").
as 'the quintessential fishing expedition."').
135.
136.

Id. at41.
Id. at 41-42:
[Tlhe collection and production of the materials demanded

was

tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a witness to

disclose the existence and location of particular documents fitting
certain broad descriptions. The assembly of literally hundreds of pages
of material in response to a request for "any and all documents

reflecting, referring, or relating to any direct or indirect sources of
money or other things of value received by or provided to" an individual
or members of his family during a 3-year period . . . is the functional

equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written
interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery deposition.
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prosecute."" 37 The Court went further and found that Hubbell not only
could, but did in fact provide evidence that led to incriminating evidence
and provided a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute., 38 The
Hubbell Court found Starr's zealous position untenable. Starr gleaned
information derived only from a grant of immunity, yet then initiated a
prosecution 39that would be impossible without Hubbell's compelled
disclosures. 1
2. Grant of Immunity Means that the Government Cannot Use Any
Evidence Derived From Compelled Testimony
The Hubbell Court described the operation of the use and derivative
use immunity provided to Hubbell. 140 The Hubbell Court described 18
U.S.C. § 6002, the federal immunity statute, as containing "a
'comprehensive safeguard' in the form of a 'sweeping proscription of any
use, direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any information
derived therefrom.""141 Use immunity allows the government to compel
production of these documents because it is coextensive with the privilege

137.

138.

139.
140.
141.

Id. at 42:
Entirely apart from the contents of the 13,120 pages of materials that
respondent produced in this case, it is undeniable that providing a
catalog of existing documents fitting within any of the 11 broadly
worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with a "lead to
incriminating evidence," or "a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute." (citation omitted).
Id. at 42-43:
What the District Court characterized as a "fishing expedition" did
produce a fish, but not the one that the Independent Counsel expected to
hook. It is abundantly clear that the testimonial aspect of respondent's
act of producing subpoenaed documents was the first step in a chain of
evidence that led to this prosecution. The documents did not magically
appear in the prosecutor's office like "manna from heaven." They
arrived there only after respondent asserted his constitutional privilege,
received a grant of immunity, and-under the compulsion of the
District Court's order-took the mental and physical steps necessary to
provide the prosecutor with an accurate inventory of the many sources
of potentially incriminating evidence sought by the subpoena. It was
only through respondent's truthful reply to the subpoena that the
Government received the incriminating documents of which it made
"substantial use . .. in the investigation that led to the indictment."
(footnote omitted).
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 39-43.
Id. at 40-43.
Id. at 39-40.
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against self-incrimination. The Hubbell Court cited Kastigar when
explaining that "a person who is prosecuted for matters related to testimony
he gave under a grant of immunity does not have the burden of proving that
his testimony was improperly used . . . instead [§ 6002] imposes an

affirmative duty on the prosecution, not merely to show that its evidence is
not tainted by the prior testimony, but 'to prove that the evidence it
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of
the compelled testimony."' 142 The Hubbell Court concluded by explaining
that "[r]equiring the prosecution to shoulder this burden ensures that the
grant of immunity has 'left the witness and the Federal Government in
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in
Given this high standard, it is
the absence of a grant of immunity.
government has "clearly . . .
the
that
found
Court
the
that
unsurprising
of Hubbell's acts of
aspect"
made 'derivative use' of the testimonial
production when obtaining the indictment against him and when preparing
its case for trial.an

Id. at 40 (citing Kastigar,406 U.S. at 460); see also id. at n.22:
A person accorded this immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002, and
subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent for the preservation of his
rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.
As stated in Murphy: "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has
testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the
federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing
that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an
independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." (quoting
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)).
Murphy at 79 n. 18.
See also Kastigar,406 U.S. at 460: "This burden of proof, which we reaffirm as appropriate,
is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty
to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony."
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 40 (citing Kastigar,406 U.S. at 458-459); see also Griffin
143.
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965) (holding that a corollary of the privilege is that
neither the judge nor the prosecutor may comment on a witness's refusal to testify after a
witness has invoked the privilege).
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41.
144.
142.
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THE PRIVILEGE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROTECT PERSONAL PAPERS
AND DIARIES

A. THE PRIVILEGE HAS MANY JUSTIFICATIONS

Some critics suggest that the Court's interpretation of the privilege is
flawed. 45 Professor Albert Alschuler has argued that the privilege "neither
mandated an accusatorial system nor afforded defendants a right to remain
silent.
[Instead,] [i]t focused upon improper methods of gaining
information from criminal suspects."'' 46 Alschuler suggested that the
privilege was merely intended to prevent torture, such as that banned in

Brown v. Mississippi. 47 As historical support, Alschuler first noted that the

justification for the privilege was to discourage torture148 and to help save a
person's soul by preventing perjury. At the time of the founding,
defendants could not testify because they were expected to perjure

145.
See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 2468; Albert W. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2651 (1996)
("[Tihe Supreme Court's current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the privilege
against self-incrimination reflects an inaccurate reading of the historical record."); see also
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 889, n.148 (1995) (criticizing the privilege
for preventing compulsory process and thus preventing innocent defendants from
exonerating themselves by grilling the guilty); Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an
Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1989):
The fifth amendment's privilege not to answer, critics carp, insulates the
guilty defendant from revealing his complicity. While this is true,
ironically it also can shackle the innocent defendant from attempting to
prove that another person committed the crime. If that other person
asserts the fifth amendment in response to questions designed to
substitute him for the defendant, the innocent defendant can neither
surmount that person's assertion nor benefit therefrom.
146.
Alschuler, supra note 145, at 2651.
147.
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
148.
Alschuler, supra note 145, at 2651:
Other sources referred to the oath as compulsion, a form of "violence"
akin to torture. Their concern appeared to be, not that the suspect would
be induced to commit perjury, but rather that he would be compelled by
improper methods to confess his crime. Concerns about tempting
suspects to commit perjury may in fact have blended with concerns
about compelling them to incriminate themselves; the choice among
perjury, contempt, and self-incrimination was indeed a "cruel
trilemma."
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themselves. 149 Second, Alschuler claimed that the founders could not have
intended to give criminal defendants the right to remain silent because50
1
Magistrates regularly interrogated defendants at the time of the founding.
Further, criminal defense lawyers were rare during this period.' 5 '
Unrepresented defendants were often subject to interrogation because "no
one could speak for them unless they spoke for themselves.' 52 Since
adverse inferences could be drawn by silence in the face of such
questioning, Alschuler explained that, at the time of the founding, "a right
to remain silent would have been a right to commit suicide."' 153 It was only
decades after the Fifth Amendment's ratification that universal
representation became the norm55154 and criminal defendants began being
considered competent to testify. 1

Id. at 2658:
[E]arly sources emphasized that placing a suspect under oath tempted
him to commit perjury. The principal concern of these sources was to
prevent what modern lawyers would call entrapment-that officials
might prompt a suspect to commit a crime that he would have avoided
in the absence of the officials' enticing conduct. The new crime,
moreover, would be perjury, an offense that would not only subject the
suspect to temporal punishment but also jeopardize his soul.
See also George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 584
(1997):
Defendants are, after all, the most prolific witnesses on their own behalf,
and they are for obvious reasons the most likely to lie. Once they won
the right to testify under oath, the average jury in the average criminal
case could expect to confront a credibility conflict that would require it
to declare one of two sworn witnesses a liar.
Alschuler, supra note 145, at 2654.
150.
Id. at 2656:
151.
[Just before 1776] even in London, only about two percent of all felony
defendants were represented by counsel, and only about 180 residents of
the American colonies were lawyers in the sense that they had been
trained at the Inns of Court. The privilege against self-incrimination
articulated by the Bill of Rights and by American state constitutions
could not have been driven by lawyer-dominated trials. (footnotes
omitted).
Id. at 2654 (citing John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege
152.
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1055-66 (1994)).
Alschuler, supra note 145, at 2654.
153.
Id. at 2660:
154.
The transformation of the privilege into a right of criminal defendants to
remain silent occurred only during the nineteenth century.
Lawyerization of the trial contributed to a changed ideology of criminal
procedure--one in which the dignity of defendants lay not in their
ability to tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability to remain
passive, to proclaim to the prosecutor "Thou sayest," and to force the
149.
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Alschuler's recognition that the privilege has developed 56 as the
surrounding circumstances have changed does not draw away from the
justifications for the rule declared by the modern court. As Justice William
0. Douglas asserted, "the protection of the Fifth Amendment transcends
the use of torture by the police. It outlaws all forms of physical, legal, or
moral compulsion utilized to make a man convict himself."'' 57 Alschuler's
assertions highlight the problems inherent in any intent-based interpretation
of Constitutional rights. 58 Although Alschuler may have correctly noted
state to shoulder the entire load. As defendants participated less in the
proceedings that determined their fate, they were seen more as objects
or as targets of the coercive forces of the state.
155.
Alschuler supra note 145, at 2661 (In 1864, Maine became the first American
jurisdiction to allow a defendant to present sworn testimony; other states quickly followed.)
156.
Id. at 2638:
The history of the modern privilege against self-incrimination can be
divided roughly into three stages, each of them captured by its own
distinctive formulation of the doctrine. At the earliest stage, the
privilege against self-incrimination was expressed in maxims like Nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare("No one shall be required to accuse himself')
and Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ("No one shall be required to
produce himself' or "No one shall be required to betray himself'). At
the second stage, the formulation was that of the United States
Constitution: No person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." At the third stage (the modem stage), the
warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona express the general although
not universal understanding of the privilege: "You have a right to
remain silent."
157.
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 145 (1958). Douglas added
that "those who would attach a sinister meaning to the invocation of the Fifth Amendment
have forgotten that history." Id. at 146.
158.
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 948 (1985):
It is commonly assumed that the "interpretive intention" of the
Constitution's framers was that the Constitution would be construed in
accordance with what future interpreters could gather of the framers'
own purposes, expectations, and intentions. Inquiry shows that
assumption to be incorrect. Of the numerous hermeneutical options that
were available in the framer's day-among them, the renunciation of
construction altogether-none corresponds to the modern notion of
intentionalism. Early interpreters usually applied standard techniques of
statutory construction to the Constitution. When a consensus eventually
emerged on a proper theory of constitutional interpretation, it indeed
centered on "original intent." But at the time, that term referred to the
"intentions" of the sovereign parties to the constitutional compact, as
evidenced in the Constitution's language and discerned through
structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer to the personal
intentions of the framers or of anyone else. The relationship of modern
intentionalism to this early interpretive theory is purely rhetorical.
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that the founders did not predict recent developments allowing nearuniversal representation of criminal defendants and allowing defendant
testimony, 159 the founders recognized the primacy of judicial interpretation
of the Constitution.160 The modem Court must deal with defense attorneys
61
to
as the norm and where defendants can, and are sometimes expected,
give sworn testimony. Notwithstanding hypothesizing on the Founder's
intent, the Court has been forced to interpret 62 the privilege in situations
that the Founders did not predict.
In these interpretations, the Court comprehensively outlined the goals
of the privilege when considering the privilege's scope in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor.163 In Murphy, union officials
refused to testify, even after granted immunity from state prosecution,
because of the threat of federal prosecution. The Murphy Court resolved
this question by holding that "the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as
well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as
well as federal law."' 64 When making this holding, the Murphy Court found
the privilege justified for a multitude of reasons.
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important
advance in the development of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks in

Alschuler, supra note 145, at 2663 (Noting that the "Framers of the Fifth
159.
Amendment ... might not have approved of sworn testimony by defendants at all."). But
see, id. at 2669 ("As Carol Steiker has observed, 'Our twentieth-century police and even our
contemporary sense of 'policing' [would be] utterly foreign to our colonial forebears.'
Nothing closely resembling stationhouse interrogation occurred at the time of the Fifth
Amendment's framing.").
See e.g., Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1-2.
160.
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 982 (2000)
161.
("Because jurors expected defendants to testify, a defendant could not afford to sit quietly
through his trial."); but see Gordon Van Kessel, EuropeanPerspectives on The Accused as a
Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA L. REV. 799, 840-41 (1998):
The traditional view has regarded the right to silence at trial as rather
weak and generally of little consequence under the assumption that
jurors, and even professional judges, ordinarily will expect the
defendant to give evidence and will hold it against defendant if he does
not take the stand. [But] [iut seems that recently, both the legal
profession and the public have become more accustomed to criminal
trials in which the defendant remains silent with his lawyers attacking
the prosecution's case, and are now more accepting of the notion that the
accused is not expected to personally provide his version of the events.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It is
162.
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
163.
Id. at 77-78 (Goldberg, J., announcing the opinion of the court).
164.
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man's struggle to make himself civilized."' 1 65 It reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to
subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load;" 166 our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life," our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while' 67sometimes "a
shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."'
Although the ambitions as announced in Murphy have been tempered
as not operating to extend the privilege's protections to a person fearing
foreign prosecution,1 68 Hubbell returned respect for the privilege by ending
the ignominious "manna from heaven" theory of compelled production. 169
The Hubbell Court, save one,1 70 returned respect for the privilege by
rejecting the placement of "the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer."''7
B.

HUBBELL ENDS THE SUBPOENAING OF PERSONAL DOCUMENTS

Scholars have persuasively argued that post-Hubbell, prosecutors have
lost their preferred method of securing truly private, personal documents:

165.
(1956)).
166.
167.
168.

Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
Id.
Balsys, 524 U.S. at 684, 691:
[T]he Murphy Court expressed a comparatively

ambitious

conceptualization of personal privacy underlying the Clause . . . we

think there would be sound reasons to stop short of resting an expansion
of the Clause's scope on the highly general statements of policy
expressed in the foregoing~quotation from Murphy. While its list does
indeed catalog aspirations furthered by the Clause, its discussion does
not even purport to weigh the host of competing policy concerns that
would be raised in a legitimate reconsideration of the Clause's scope.
169.
See Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
170.
530 U.S. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting his satisfaction with the
manna from heaven approach).
171.

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
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the subpoena, and must now rely on the search warrant.172 This major
change removes a power rife for abuse by zealous prosecutors. While the
Hubbell majority did not explicitly state that private papers returned to the
protections provided in Boyd, the Hubbell concurrence strongly supported
returning to the views of the Boyd concurrence.173 But the Hubbell Court
limited itself to the facts of the case, which did not include any challenge to
Fisher. The Court here focused on emphasizing how the government
cannot compel production of personal papers without meeting the Fisher
test.
In Hubbell, the Court began its analysis of the application of the
privilege against self-incrimination to compelled production of documents

Cole, supra note 48, at 128-29 ("Prosecutors prefer subpoenas to search
172.
warrants [because] . . . [i]n the federal system, subpoenas can be issued by prosecutors
without judicial review or approval, and grand jury subpoenas for documents need not
satisfy the Fourth Amendment particularity and probable cause requirements that apply to
search warrants.").
See also id. at 129:
[Tihe Hubbell decision effectively, if not explicitly, overruled Fisher in
cases where prosecutors are seeking private documents from an
individual. After Hubbell, prosecutors no longer can use a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum and a grant of "act of production immunity" to
compel production of documents by an individual who is a subject or
target of a grand jury investigation without risking the loss of their
ability to prosecute that individual.
See also William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
TranssubstantiveFourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 857, 865 (2001):
Like most white-collar criminal investigations, the inquiry into
Clinton's misdeeds involved the heavy use of subpoenas, not searches..
• in Hubbell, the Supreme Court appeared to conclude that unless the
government knows-really knows-of a particular document's
existence, a subpoena's target is free to refuse to turn the document
over, because the act of producing the document would testify to the
fact that it does indeed exist. Of course, if the government really does
know that the document exists, and hence knows what is in it
(knowledge of contents tends to track knowledge of existence), the
government can probably get a warrant to search for and seize the
document. Thus, after Hubbell, the working rule will be something like
the following: When faced with subpoenas for documents, suspects can
comply or not as they wish. For its part, the government can search for
the evidence it wants, so long as it satisfies the probable cause and
warrant requirements.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("A substantial body of
173.
evidence suggests that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the compelled
production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any incriminating evidence. In a
future case, I would be willing to reconsider the scope and meaning of the SelfIncrimination Clause.").
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by emphasizing the "settled proposition that a person may be required to
produce specific documents even though they contain incriminating
assertions of fact or belief because the creation of those documents was not
'compelled' within the meaning of the privilege."'' 74 Professor Lance Cole
noted that "this matter of fact assertion, unthinkable in the era of Boyd, is a
direct outgrowth of Fisher'snew conception of the nature of the protection
against self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment."'' 75 Cole
explained that Hubbell's practical effect was to overrule Fisher and restore
"full, meaningful (as opposed to 'act of production') Fifth Amendment
' 76
protection to most private papers in the possession of an individual.'
Cole believed that "the distinction between the contents of documents and
the act of producing documents remains viable, but the significance of that
distinction will vary based upon what knowledge the prosecution has when
it seeks to compel production of documents."'' 77 Subpoenas can no longer
be used as a fishing expedition because, as Fisher enumerated, the
government must show "prior knowledge of the existence, location, and
authenticity of the documents," to 78
prevent the act of production privilege
witness.
a
by
exercised
being
from
Cole claimed that Hubbell means that truly private documents 79 in the
possession of an individual' 80 are "fully protected by the Fifth
Amendment."' 8' Cole explained that "if the witness produces the document
pursuant to a grant of use and derivative use immunity, then neither the
physical act of production of the document nor the contents of the
document can be used against the witness in a subsequent prosecution.' 82
According to Cole, this result is "more like the holding of Boyd than that of
Fisher [because] the application of the Fifth Amendment to an individual's
private papers may have returned very nearly to the level of protection that

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35-36.
Cole, supra note 48, at 142.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. See also Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 n.6:
To hold that the Government may not compel a person to produce
incriminating evidence (absent an appropriate grant of immunity) does
not necessarily answer the question whether (and, if so, when) the
Government may secure that same evidence through a search or seizure.
The lawfulness of such actions, however, would be measured by the
Fourth Amendment rather than the Fifth.
179.
In that others, including the government, do not know either that the document
exists or that the witness possesses it.
180.
Not a collective entity, see supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
181.
Cole, supra note 48, at 191.
182.
Id.
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Boyd was understood to provide."' 83 Cole added that "the Fisherdistinction
between contents and the act of production remains valid because the
need not show any knowledge of the contents of the
government 84
documents."1
GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE SOME CONTENT KNOWLEDGE TO COMPEL
C.
PRODUCTION

Overall, Cole's analysis was sound except for two points, one being
relatively minor. First, Cole's explanation that the distinction in Fisher
85
(between contents and the act of production) has been all but obliterated
appears flawed. True, contents will only matter in reference to the
testimonial value of the act of production in that the contents must have the
potential to incriminate or lead to incriminating evidence or else the
privilege will not apply. For example, the government will remain free to
subpoena all the testimony they want regarding the contents of documents
that cannot be considered as incriminating or possibly leading to
incriminating information. Second, and more importantly, Cole incorrectly
claimed that "if the government can show that it knows the witness keeps a
diary and that the diary is in the witness's possession, then the government
can compel production, even if the government has no idea what the diary
says."' 186 Why would Cole, who had voiced concerns about governmental
fishing expeditions,187 think that the Court has set a standard by which the
government's bare showing that a person has a diary, and has possession
over this diary, should allow compelled production without any grant of
immunity, and without any further showing by the government that the
diary contains information that the government has a valid reason to search
for? Cole's definition requiring compelled testimony appears to apply
equally to other personal papers as well. I believe that governmental
knowledge of content does matter in that the government must show some
knowledge of content prior to requesting personal documents. Cole
misunderstood that this is what the Court mandated in Fisher - it is just

183.

184.

Id.
Id.

Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Cole, supra note 48, at 191. (Cole later appropriately declared that "if the
187.
government lacks knowledge of whether the witness possesses a particular document or
class of documents and is merely engaged in a 'fishing expedition,' then a witness can assert
the act of production privilege, and the three-step, post-Hubbell act of production analysis
applies.").
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that this requirement has been misunderstood. Cole's position here is
wrong. If the government bears no burden to demonstrate knowledge of
content, then the broad definition of diary, not to mention other personal
papers, provides ample room for egregious fishing expeditions.
To elaborate, a diary is defined by Merriam-Webster as "a record of
events, transactions, or observations kept daily or at frequent intervals. ' 88
This definition covers almost all personal papers people keep. For example,
the Microsoft Outlook program, which can keep a calendar of events, may
also qualify as a diary. Also consider that in the course of two years, a
Microsoft Outlook inbox folder can accrue tens of thousands of email
messages and other notes. Many of these personal messages may be
innocuous, but some are highly personal. If personal papers are
unprotected, then a prosecutor could subpoena your "private diaries,"
seeking not only any written diary you possess, but also your entire
Microsoft Outlook files. These files, in essence, contain "a record of
events" of your life, and thus qualify as a diary. Additionally, this file,
which includes your transactions such as bill receipts, plane reservations,
and car rental information, clearly contains "observations kept daily or at
frequent intervals."
Cole's test states that the government need not have any obligation to
prove content of what they seek. Under this test, if the government could
prove that you regularly use Microsoft Outlook and that you possess the
computer containing these files, they may compel production of all of your
messages over your privilege objection and without granting immunity.
Such an action would similarly work for all your other personal papers,
including your other personal correspondence and notes that you take. If
you refused this subpoena, you would face contempt or perjury charges.
The government would be free to use your personal files to interview
everyone you had contact with to see if you had broken any law or even to
see if you had failed to turn over a letter, upon which they could prosecute
you as well as the person they questioned about you. 189 Cole in essence
claimed that prosecutors have this power over you or any other citizen.
The policy implications for such a ruling are quite daunting in their
extension of a police state beyond that conceived of by the founding
fathers. A ruling ratifying this powerful position for prosecutors may

188.
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary Online, www.m-w.com (Last visited
on Feb. 16, 2004).
189.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (making it a felony to make "any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" to a government agent or to make or
use "any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry," with no materiality requirement).

2004]

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PAPERS AND BOYD

encourage many people to either destroy or encrypt personal documents 90
to prevent potential governmental intrusion into their private lives. Some
people would find it hard to imagine that our government would exercise
this power unjustly.' 91 Some, including some Justices, 192 could argue that
such tactics are minor inconveniences that must be tolerated because law
enforcement only uses them to get bad guys and protect society. 193 But, if
prosecutors are rewarded by using a dragnet over many innocents by
gaining even slightly more convictions, they will continue to do so unless
an outcry. 194 If society waits too long, no outcry may
the process generates
95
be effective.

190.
See, e.g., Aaron M. Clemens, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The
Fifth Amendment Prevents Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or Private
Key, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, n.159 (2004).
191.
Patricia J. Williams, Reasons for Doubt, THE NATION, Dec. 30, 2002 (Professor
Williams recounted how she heard a Massachusetts judge remark "[t]he police don't have
time to arrest innocent people. If the defendant didn't commit this particular crime, he did
something, somewhere, sometime.").
192.
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) ("[B]rief, standardized, discretionless, roadblock seizures of automobiles,
seizures ... effectively serve a weighty state interest with only minimal intrusion on the
privacy of their occupants ... there is nothing in the record to indicate that the addition of
the dog sniff lengthens these otherwise legitimate seizures."). But see id. at 56 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have
considered "reasonable" a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of
wrongdoing."); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.):
[A]s a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped ... [t]he only
change [that] will result from ordering them out of the car is that they
will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car [and that will be
acceptable because] the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to
prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the
driver.
193.
Cf, Frank H. Wu, A Practice that Tears at the Civic Fabric, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 21, 2002, at 19 ("To those who are rarely pulled over by cops, subjected to
body-cavity examinations by custom agents, or followed by store security guards, the
preventative measures may seem only minor inconveniences.").
194.
Ben White, ACLU Suit Accuses U.S. Customs of 'Profiling',WASH. POST, May
14, 2000, at A6:
A report issued last month by the General Accounting Office, the
congressional watchdog agency, found that black women were nearly
twice as likely to be strip-searched on suspicion of drug smuggling than
white men or women, a practice not supported by a higher rate of
discovery of drugs or other illegal substances among minority groups.
Cf, Michael A. Fletcher, Customs Review Finds Flaws; DisproportionateSearching of
Black Women Is Curtailed,WASH. POST, June 29, 2000, at A29:
In response to the complaints, Customs Service Commissioner
Raymond W. Kelly appointed the review commission last year and
began moving on a series of reforms to tighten oversight of the searches.
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Undoubtedly, a swift spread of this tactic over many people would
generate an instant outcry.1 96 Yet, if Cole is correct, the ability to subpoena
(not just surreptitiously seize) 197 private papers and documents from any
individual sits in prosecutors' quivers. I have had the pleasure to know
many fine and ethical prosecutors from all across America. These
prosecutors worked in local, state, and federal prosecutor's offices. Yet,
there is great danger in providing even the most ethical set of people with
the awesome power to call in any person to inspect their personal records,
particularly when the government knows that any evidence of wrongdoing
they come across may be used against this person. Furthermore, a person
compelled to provide personal documents after being given immunity must
not be "dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and
good faith of the prosecuting authorities." 198 Therefore, just as the Hubbell
Court declared that a broad swath of documents cannot be subpoenaed with
a grant of use immunity and then used against a person, I believe that

The changes have brought dramatic reductions in the number of
personal searches done by the agency. Customs officials have reported
that the number of searches was down 75 percent in the first six months
of this fiscal year compared with the same period last year. Meanwhile,
they said, the number of seizures has declined by just 20 percent.
195.
See, e.g., Pastor Martin Niembller, who was arrested by the Nazis in 1937 and
spent seven years in a German concentration camp, translated from German:
First they came for the Communists, but I was not a Communist, so I
said nothing. Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not a
Social Democrat, so I did nothing. Then they came for the trade
unionists, but I was not a trade unionist. And then they came for the
Jews, but I was not a Jew, so I did little. Then when they came for me,
there was no one left to stand up for me.
196.
Cf., Clarence Page, Hunting 'Terrorists' in Vegas Strip Clubs, CHI. TRIB., Nov.

12, 2003, at 25 (noting no popular outcry after "the FBI ... used the Patriot Act[] . .. to

subpoena financial information about four local politicians and one local" strip club owner
in San Diego and Las Vegas, but suggesting that "[C]ivil liberties should not be a partisan
fight. After all, the privacy you save may be your own.").
197.
A subpoena is superfluous in cases of money laundering under Section 314 of
the Patriot Act. See, Steve Friess, Critics Slam Use of PatriotAct in Nevada Bribery Case,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2003, at 12:
Department of Justice spokesman Mark Corallo said Section 314 was
inserted into the Patriot Act at the request of then-Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) to give the FBI new
weapons for fighting money laundering. The provision allows an FBI
agent to demand financial records without a grand jury subpoena by
certifying in classified documentation that the agent's suspicion of
money laundering activity is reasonable. If a judge at trial believes the
certification is inadequate, the judge may throw out the evidence
gathered, Corallo said.
198.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 40 n.22.
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subpoenas for broad swaths of personal papers should never overcome the
privilege simply because the government can prove that these broad swaths
of documents exist and are possessed by the subpoenaed party. I hope that
the Court will never submit to such a suggestion. It is heartening that eight
current Justices recently signed onto an opinion ratifying the declaration
that "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding."'' 99 This Court, save one, 200 has
not been easily duped by talk of benefits derived from providing additional
power to law enforcement.
Surely, criminal investigations may be temporarily aided if each
citizen could be compelled to provide the government with personal papers
accounting of all our activities, and if the government could use evidence
derived from these papers against us in court. But such subpoenas would
run afoul of both the privilege against self-incrimination and the
presumption of innocence. 2° 1 Hubbell noted and accepted this position.
Like in Hubbell, it would be readily apparent from the text of a subpoena
seeking a diary and other such private documents "that the prosecutor
needed respondent's assistance both to identify potential sources of
information and to produce those sources." 20 2 If the government could
make such broad requests for personal documents such as a records of
events, transactions, or observations kept at frequent intervals, then just like
in Hubbell "the collection and production of the materials demanded
[would be] tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a
witness to disclose the existence and location of particular documents
fitting certain broad descriptions. 2 3 Unless the Court holds otherwise, the
three-step, post-Hubbell act of production analysis outlined by Cole must

199.
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding that
simply showing a symbolic "commitment to the struggle against drug abuse" cannot justify
drug testing all candidates for public office without showing some problems of drug abuse
among such candidates) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
200.
Chandler,520 U.S. at 323-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Hubbell, 530 U.S.
at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
201.
("[A]t the end of the day the presumption of innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts
we take with those whom we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and,
ultimately, ourselves.").
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41.
202.
203.
Id.
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apply in all cases. Unless the Court changes or holds otherwise, the threestep, post-Hubbell act of production analysis outlined by Cole must apply
in all cases involving personal papers, including diaries, with the potential
exclusion from protection by the privilege of tax-related financial records
whose creation and retention by a third-party has been statutorily required
by the government. 204
D.

APPLYING COLE'S THREE-STEP ANALYSIS

Cole's three-phase analysis involves "Assessing the Testimonial
Value of the Act of Production"; "Determining Whether the Act of
and "The Kastigar Use and Derivative Use
Production is Incriminating";
20 5
Inquiry."
Immunity
1.
Phase One - Hubbell ReinvigoratesFisher's Foregone Conclusion
Analysis

In his enumeration of phase one, Cole noted that the Hubbell Court
required that the government prove "prior knowledge of either the
existence of or the whereabouts of" the evidence ultimately produced by
Hubbell.,, 206 Therefore, under Cole's analysis of Hubbell, the government
has, at minimum, a burden to meet the test of prior knowledge with
"reasonable particularity. 2 °7 The government's burden cannot be met by a

204.
Such documents are outside of the scope of this analysis. But see Bait. City
Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (arguing a custodian has no privilege
to refuse examination of books and papers held lawfully subject to examination by the
demanding authority even if their contents tend to incriminate him); Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976); Cal. Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (upholding
the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, rejecting the argument of bank
customers that the recordkeeping requirements imposed on the banks by the Act violated the
customers' Fifth Amendment rights because a party incriminated by evidence produced by a
third party sustained no violation of his own Fifth Amendment rights).
Cole, supra note 48, at 184-88.
205.
206.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 ("[Tlhe Government has not shown that it had any prior
knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents
ultimately produced by respondent.").
Cole, supra note 48, at 184-85:
207.
The only significant question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in
Hubbell is how the courts should decide a close case in which the
government has some prior knowledge but the witness asserts an act of
production privilege and declines to produce the subpoenaed
documents. Future development of the case law should answer this
question, as the lower courts decide whether to adopt the D.C. Circuit's
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simple allegation that a witness has some personal documents, such as a
diary. Because a diary is "a record of events, transactions, or observations
kept daily or at frequent intervals,, 20 8 allowing compelled production
without immunity upon such a simple allegation would allow the
government to compel any person to open up their innermost thoughts with
impunity. Such a result ignores Hubbell's reinvigoration of the foregone
conclusion analysis. Cole noted that the first phase "flow[s] from [sic] first
phase of the post- Hubbell act of production analysis: the reinvigorated
Fisher/DoeI foregone conclusion inquiry. ' 2 9 As the Hubbell Court held, a
court that allows a prosecution to proceed upon a lax foregone conclusion
inquiry "misreads Fisher and ignores [the Court's] subsequent decision in
United States v. Doe."210 The Court's explicit holding was that
immunization was required and that any prosecution derived from
Hubbell's disclosures was impermissible because "it is undeniable that
providing a catalog of existing documents fitting within any of the 11
broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with a
'lead to incriminating
evidence,' or 'a link in the chain of evidence needed
21
to prosecute.' 1
The FisherCourt's holding rests upon the facts.2 12 The facts in Fisher
provide no support for allowing governmental subpoenas for a broad swath
of private papers where the government has no knowledge of their
content.213 In Fisher, the Court accepted the government's position that a
taxpayer's lawyer can be compelled to produce the workpapers of the
client's accountant without a grant of immunity to the client for the
production of these papers.2t 4 The Fisher Court held that a person cannot
turn in a tax return to the government and then claim a privilege in the
accountant's workpapers used to create this tax return because the taxpayer

"reasonable particularity" test-and nothing in the Supreme Court's
Hubbell opinion suggests they should not do so--or develop alternative
tests.
But see Clemens, supra note 185. 1 argue that the government should be required to prove
this knowledge of the existence of or the whereabouts of this diary by clear and convincing
evidence.
208.
Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, available at http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=diary (Last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
209.
Cole, supra note 48, at 186.
210.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)).
211.
Id.at 42.
212.
Fisher,425 U.S. at 410 (The FisherCourt noted that "[t]hese questions perhaps
do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the
facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof.").
213. Id. at 410.
214. Id. at 394-95.
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has no personal ownership in these papers.21 5 Thus, the FisherCourt held
that the existence of the tax documents there was "a foregone conclusion"
because "the Government already knew that the documents were in the
attorneys' possession and could independently confirm their existence and
authenticity through the accountants who created them." 216 The Fisher
Court did not compel production of personal papers without immunity and
without the government having prior knowledge of the contents. The
Fisher Court focused on a narrow subpoena of business records which had
been produced by a third party. In Fisher,the government could accurately
describe the content of the papers they sought because they sought a
narrow group of documents that were of unquestionable relevance to their
tax investigation and that had already been voluntarily turned over to
another party.21 7 The holding in Fisher, reiterated in Doe and Hubbell, is
that the government must "independently confirm the existence and
authenticity" of targeted documents before it can compel production. 21 8 In

the case of personal papers, including a diary, a similar independent
confirmation of the existence and authenticity of the targeted papers must
occur. I argued elsewhere that this confirmation should require clear and
convincing proof of the existence and authenticity of these documents, 2 9 a
standard of proof that will be difficult to establish if the government has no
idea of the content of the documents and, instead, relies on innuendo to
compel a person to turn over personal documents without a grant of
immunity. Surely, the government needs no probable cause to initiate an
investigation before a grand jury. An investigation may be triggered by
tips, rumors, or evidence given by the prosecutors. 220 But the reasonable
particularity standard, or even the clear and convincing standard, is not an
impermissible attempt to enjoin a grand jury investigation.221 It is well
established that the grand jury's right to inquire into possible offenses is
unrestrained by technical or evidentiary rules,222 but the privilege is a
Constitutional right and must be treated as such, particularly in the case of
a pending criminal trial where a defendant seeks to exercise her Sixth

215.

Id. at 409 ("The accountant's workpapers are not the taxpayer's. They were not

216.

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45.

prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by him.").

217.
Fisher,425 U.S. at 402, n.7.
218.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45.
219.
See, e.g., Clemens, supra note 185.
220.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
221.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (U.S. Steel-Clairton Works), 525 F.2d 151, 157
(3d Cir. 1975).
222.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
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Amendment rights, which naturally must include ensuring that her Fifth
Amendment rights were respected.
Although the privilege does not protect contents alone, the
government cannot avoid meeting a burden of proof, even if it will be the
reasonable particularity standard.223 Cole correctly noted that the
government must prove existence and possession of personal documents.
But Cole did not claim that the government's burden must involve proving
specific knowledge as to the content of the private papers they seek under
the reasonable particularity standard. Allowing broad subpoenas for diaries
and personal papers without even a general knowledge of what they contain
vitiates the protections mandated by the privilege against self-incrimination
by allowing the government to fish for testimonial evidence whenever they
can establish that a target possesses a broad swath of material ripe for
subpoena. These requests should be quashed unless immunity is granted.
This is because such broad requests, like in Hubbell, will make it
"unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of 'the
contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents
responsive to the requests in the subpoena. 224 Except in the rare case of a
subpoenaed diary that is only a locked hardbound notebook hidden under a
bed,225 such subpoenas and the ensuing "assembly of those documents" will
be akin to impermissibly requiring a person to tell the government "the
combination to a wall safe" and would be quite unlike "being forced to
surrender the key to a strongbox," which is permissible.22 6 To overcome
this Constitutional problem, the government should instead rely on a search
warrant, as Cole wisely suggested.227
Even if the government can prove that a person possesses "a record of
228
events, transactions, or observations kept daily or at frequent intervals,"

223.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 33 (The majority did not address the reasonable
particularity standard because Starr had "acknowledged that he could not satisfy the
Ireasonable particularity' standard prescribed by the Court of Appeals" and thus there was
no need to address whether a higher burden was required of the government because they
acceded that they could not meet this lower standard).
224.
Id. at 43 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957); United
States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).

225.
This type of personal diary might grow extinct due to the rise of computing
skills among the young and the rise in portable electronics coupled with the low price of
electronic diaries such as the encryptable and portable computerized Alpha Journal
(formerly My Personal Diary). See Alpha Realms Website at
http://www.alpharealms.com/journal/index.htm (last visited on Mar. 15, 2004).

226.
Id.
227.
See Cole, supra note 48.
228.
Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, at www.m-w.com (last visited on Feb.
16, 2004).
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this is not, as Cole suggested, a standard rigorous enough to independently
confirm the existence and authenticity of all such private documents held
by a person. The government's request must be more circumscribed unless
greater proof of content can be provided. The holding in Hubbell, by
upholding Fisherand Boyd, suggests that the proper rule for private papers
is that government can only seek a narrow group of documents that are of
unquestionable relevance in an investigation. 229 This is a tougher standard.
It will be difficult for the government to establish that a series of private
subpoenaed documents are of unquestionable relevance to the investigation
without some knowledge as to the content of such documents. But, where
the government has no knowledge as to content, a situation in which
relevance, particularly the unquestionable kind, would be a near impossible
burden to meet, I suggest that the government cannot compel a person to
turn over these documents. Further, it would be inappropriate for the Court
to engage in any in camera inspection of the sought documents to
determine if the government is correct that the documents are relevant
unless the government proffered 230 a specified list of crimes it was
investigating with these subpoenas as well as the content of the evidence
the government expected to find in the narrow group of requested
documents which are of clear relevance to the investigation. Therefore, the
government should bear the burden of proving the possession of these
documents and their existence, in addition to proving the documents'
relevance, a burden that must nearly always reference the documents'
content, just as proving possession and existence must nearly always
reference content.
Undoubtedly the government will sometimes meet this particularized
burden of showing, by whatever applicable standard,23' possession,
existence, and relevance of a set of documents. For example, if the
government can prove that a specific series of diary entries exist, that the
target possesses them, and that these documents are relevant to an
investigation, then they can meet the Fisher test. The situation of Senator
Bob Packwood illustrates this. Packwood was not a case involving a
subpoena for an entire personal diary without governmental knowledge of
the diary's contents, possession by the target, or relevance to an
investigation. In Packwood's case, the government had met all three
factors. The government had knowledge of the contents of Packwood's
diary, its possession by him, and its relevance to the investigation. The
Senator established proof of a personal diary because when he faced

229.
230.
231.

Fisher,425 U.S. at 401, n.7.
Ex parne if disclosure would compromise an ongoing investigation.
See Clemens, supra note 185.
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congressional investigation, instead of invoking the privilege, he "offered
information from his diaries during his Ethics Committee deposition, thus
informing the committee that the diaries existed and contained information
relevant to the investigation. 2 32 Packwood provided further verification
when he negotiated a deal allowing the committee to examine his diaries,
which they did. 233 Packwood broke the deal "after the committee sought
information from the diaries outside of the initial scope of the
investigation. 2 34 At this point, Packwood had provided the government
with knowledge of the contents of the diaries and the relevance of the
diaries to the investigation. By the time Packwood, in February of 1994,
went to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to seek
protection under the Fifth Amendment for the contents of his diaries, it had
become too late. 35 That Court ordered Packwood to comply with the
subpoena and turn over his diaries to the committee after holding.23 6 After
the Supreme Court denied a stay of the district court order pending appeal,
Packwood agreed on March 15, 1994 to turn over his diaries.237
Packwood supports the proposition that the government can compel a
person to disclose personal papers, such as a diary, when the government
meets the test of showing possession by the target, knowledge, and
relevance. The latter two factors relate to content, of which the government
had knowledge in Packwood. Packwood is distinguishable from many
other cases of a subpoenaed diary. For example, Packwood provided the
government with knowledge of his diary's content and waived the
privilege's protection by selectively using parts of a diary in an attempt to
publicly vindicate himself before an investigative body.23 8 Then Packwood
attempted to hide behind the privilege when the aforementioned
investigative body sought the diary he had already made known.
Packwood's earlier action had to be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Just as a witness cannot testify on direct

232.
Will, supra note 8, at 965.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
235.
Id. at 966 (citing S. Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17
(D.D.C. 1994)).
236.
Id. (The Court held "that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of
any personal papers, and therefore does not protect Senator Packwood's personal diaries
from the reach of the Ethics Committee subpoena.").
237.
Id. (citing Packwood v. S. Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994)).
238.
See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (holding that in the ordinary
case an individual under compulsion to make disclosures as a witness, who reveals
information instead of claiming the privilege, loses the benefit of the privilege. This is so
because if such a witness makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the
government has not "compelled" him to incriminate himself).
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examination and then invoke the privilege when the prosecutor seeks to
cross examine on the same topic, 239 a person cannot selectively cite a diary
and then assert the privilege to protect the rest of the diary. Packwood
could have demonstrated his desire to protect his personal papers by
asserting the privilege throughout the investigation. But by bringing part of
the diary into light during an investigation, Packwood provided proof that
the personal document existed and that its contents were relevant to the
investigation. This natural limitation on the privilege does not mandate that
broad subpoenas for a diary or other private papers are enforceable when
the government lacks any information regarding the existence, possession,
or relevance of personal papers, including a diary.
There are other situations whereby an entire diary or set of personal
papers could be subpoenaed after the government meets a test for
particularity. The fact alone that a person regularly records events should
not be enough to allow a subpoena covering all of the person's regular
recording of events. Take, for example, a situation when the government
can prove that a person regularly uses a specific calendar, either paper or
electronic, to record meetings or telephone messages. In such a case, the
government could often prove, especially with the reasonable particularity
standard, that this specific calendar should be produced, just as they could
subpoena a lone hardbound notebook diary that a target had been noted
writing in. In such a case, the government could secure a subpoena because
they have witnesses who would aver as to the existence, possession, and
relevance of this personal calendar, including content. This situation is
especially true in a case where the calendar was filled out by a third party,
24
such as a personal assistant or secretary, as in Martha Stewart's case. On
such facts as these, the calendar would no longer be a personal paper due to
the fact that it had been voluntarily handed over to a third party for a

But see Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (stating that a witness who
239.
is compelled to take the stand has no occasion to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination until testimony is sought to be elicited, which will in fact tend to incriminate,
and that it would indeed be irrelevant for him to do so).
See, e.g., Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, The Martha Stewart Verdict: The
240.
Overview; Stewart Found Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, Al:

[The jury's decision to convict] was especially influenced by the
testimony of Ms. Stewart's assistant, Ann E. Armstrong, who cried on
the stand but also told the court that she had taken a particular telephone
message about ImClone from Mr. Bacanovic on Dec. 27, 2001, one that
did not match what Mr. Bacanovic told investigators he left. The same
message, 'Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to start trading
downward,' was later partly erased by Ms. Stewart after a telephone
conversation with her lawyer, Ms. Armstrong said.
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significant period of time. 24 And, where a historic practice by a party can
be established by the government, the government could even meet the
tests of reasonable particularity for the part of a calendar that they did not
have specific information on. For example, if the government can prove
that Stewart used a Blackberry handheld computer to write notes to her
secretary about her calendar on five separate occasions in one month, then
a court can reasonably extrapolate from the information provided that the
government met the burden of proving with reasonable particularity that
Stewart communicated to her secretary on more than those five occasions.
But, it would clearly be inappropriate for the government to use evidence
that a person typically keeps a particular calendar at work as a basis to
request that the person provide any and all personal papers in their
possession showing the arrangements of meetings. Such a request would
not only serve as a contempt and perjury trap, it would circumvent the
reasonable particularity requirements of showing the existence of this
content as well as the relevance of the other scheduling documents.
Similarly, evidence that a 16-year-old female relative of former President
Bill Clinton kept a journal of all her private thoughts in a little book with a
flowery cover and a built-in-lock under her bed could provide support for
requiring production of this document in a case brought by Starr to recoup
the babysitting funds she had evaded paying taxes on. But, it would be
inappropriate for this evidence to provide a basis for a subpoena requesting
the production of any and all information regarding her private thoughts
that this girl put down. This would be inappropriate even if the
government placed a reasonable time limit on its request, for example, by
limiting the request to a period contemporaneous with the time they
established that she used the aforementioned flowery cover diary. Allowing
such a request would circumvent the existence requirement. Just as the
Hubbell Court approvingly cited the Doe Court's rejection of subpoenas
242
which "sought several broad categories of general business records
because they would involve testimonial incrimination, the post-Hubbell
Court should reject as unsound any subpoenas which seek several broad
categories of general personal papers, including diaries.
As a policy matter, if broad subpoenas for private papers were allowed
without making the government meet a high burden, the prosecution's
arguable benefits from such an intrusive policy would be outweighed by
the fear of intrusion into every citizen's life. While the first such subpoena

241.
Couch, 409 U.S. at 334-35.
242.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 ("The Doe subpoenas also sought several broad
categories of general business records, yet we upheld the District Court's finding that the act
of producing those records would involve testimonial self-incrimination.").
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might result in some truthful evidence helpful during a prosecution, such a
holding would have an enormous chilling effect on every person's storage
of personal reflections or recollections.24 3 Such a holding would mean that
prescient people would draft personal recollections knowing that they may
later be compelled to produce these so-called innermost thoughts, which
could then be used against them during a prosecution. These people would
eschew honest reflection in favor of penning self-serving and selective
recollections of events. The adoptions of such methods would circumvent
the design of a rule to allow compelled production of personal papers,
which is intended to help investigate and prosecute criminal activity, while
concurrently obliterating the potential for the reflection in which many

scholars suggest criminals engage. If criminals really do break the law after
consciously weighing the consequences of such actions evaluating the
examples made of previous lawbreakers, 24 then allowing the subpoena of
personal papers would undoubtedly chill the reflection our justice system
depends upon as justification for punishment. Such weighing of potential
penalties would become very risky if diaries would be subpoenaed unless
they were transcribed by a person's attorney. Since most people
undoubtedly cannot afford to consult an attorney to pen these reflections,

See Suzanne Rosenthal Brackley, Constitutional Law: Now It's Personal:
243.
Withdrawing the Fifth Amendment's Content-Based Protection for All Private Papers in
United States v. Doe, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 585-86 (1994):
Because an individual's inner thoughts become more vulnerable to
governmental intrusion once they are conveyed to paper, there is a very
real need to retain a content-based fifth amendment privilege for private
papers. Without such protection for papers that are private in nature,
creativity and personal expression may be chilled, as individuals may
justly hesitate to record thoughts solely for their own benefit or pleasure
... . Such private papers may contain deeply personal confessions.
Whether incriminating or "innocent," one's confessions in personal
papers are the equivalent of private thoughts. The government should
not have access to the same thoughts that it cannot force the individual
to utter merely because those thoughts were recorded for personal use.
The Fifth Amendment was designed to protect individuals from such
invasions into their minds. To dispense with such protections, and allow
the government to extract information more conveniently from criminal
suspects, undermines the meaning and importance of this deeply
ingrained law.
See Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the
244.
Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1155
(2003) ("General deterrence . . . imposes punishment with the intention of discouraging
future acts of wrongdoing ...

it aims at deterring people generally ...

by making a public

example of the offender."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(B) (2000) (identifying among
the justifications for punishment that inform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that the law
serve "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.").
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such a rule would drastically reduce the reflection people engage in,
increasing the amount of crime committed all while not facilitating further
convictions and resulting in a grave loss of privacy for all.
2. Phase Two - Verifying Existence, Location, and Authenticity Priorto
Compelled Production
Phase two involves determining whether the act of production is
incriminating. Cole explained that "[i]f the information that is
communicated by the act of production (e.g., the existence, location, and
authenticity of the documents produced) 'would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute the [witness,]' then the privilege should be
upheld. ''245 This portion of the ruling simply created a cautionary tale for
prosecutors. If any of the information provided by subpoena is deemed
testimonial, then government must, before a prosecution of an immunized
person, prove that no evidence will be presented at trial that is derivative of
the compelled testimonial evidence. The key to this analysis is the question
of what is testimonial.246
The government cannot argue that the compelled evidence they gained
was not incriminating where the evidence at trial was derived from the
compelled evidence. The burden to prove independent possession of such
evidence is high in cases where the act of producing such evidence under
compulsion is deemed testimonial. With the death of the manna from
heaven approach, the government will now be well-served by placing, in
camera, all the information they gathered prior to the compelled and
immunized production of documents from a target or witness so that they
do not lose the ability to prosecute after this disclosure.247
3.

Phase Three - Kastigar Immunity Inquiry

Phase three involves the Kastigarimmunity inquiry. Cole noted that a
court which finds that an act of production of documents is testimonial and
incriminating "will uphold a witness's assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination and will not grant a motion to compel production by the

245.
246.
247.

Cole, supra note 48, at 186 (citing Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38).
See supra Part II.
See supra text at notes 116-118.
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prosecution., 248 As the Court noted in Hubbell, any convictions that used
such impermissible evidence must be vacated. 249
HUBBELL CONCURRENCE DEEMS ANYONE WHO PRESENTS EVIDENCE A
E.
WITNESS AND WOULD REQUIRE IMMUNITY FOR ANY COMPELLED EVIDENCE

In his Hubbell concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas claimed that the
Hubbell majority wrongly analyzed the privilege, though he noted that the
25°
issue had not been raised below and thus could not be considered. Justice
Thomas explained that the Hubbell majority held that only witnesses can
qualify for the privilege. 251 Relying on prior cases, the Hubbell majority
defined "'witness' as a person who provides testimony, and thus restricts
the Fifth Amendment's ban to only those communications 'that are
'testimonial' in character.' 252 But Justice Thomas noted that the Court had
never "undertaken an analysis of the meaning of [witness] at the time of the
founding., 253 Justice Thomas' own research found "substantial support for
the view that the term 'witness' meant a person who gives or furnishes
evidence, a broader 254meaning than that which our case law currently
ascribes to the term.,
In the views of Justice Thomas and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Boyd
Court hewed to the Founders understanding that "'witness' means one who
gives evidence., 255 Justice Thomas therefore wrote in Hubbell that it was
Fisher'swrongheaded rejection of the Founders' understanding of witness
that "permit[ed] the Government to force a person to furnish incriminating
physical evidence and protecting only the 'testimonial' aspects of that
transfer., 256 Thomas faulted the FisherCourt for "fail[ing] to examine the
historical backdrop to the Fifth Amendment," a fault that created "a
' 257
difficult parsing of the act of responding to a subpoena duces tecum, , a

248.
249.
250.

Cole, supra note 48, at 187.
See supra Part 11 (B) (1-2).
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 ("None of the parties in this case has asked us to depart

from Fisher, but in light of the historical evidence that the Self-Incrimination Clause may

have a broader reach than Fisherholds, I remain open to a reconsideration of that decision
and its progeny in a proper case.").
Id. at 49.
251.
Id. at 49-50.
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Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 (citing Fisher,425 U.S. at 408).
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parsing that he recognized that the Hubbell majority was attempting to
rectify.
But Justice Thomas wanted to go further than the minor tweaking
given by the majority in Hubbell. Private papers, including diaries, will
gain great protection if, in a future case, the Hubbell concurrence of
Justices Thomas and Scalia hold sway. 58 This idea is not far fetched. For
example, in Crawford v. Washington,259 Justice Scalia recently redefined
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause by similarly looking back
towards the Founders' original conception. Justice Scalia explained in
Crawford that a hearsay exception will only survive a Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause challenge if this exception existed at the time of the
founding.26 ° If the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas persuade three
26 1 the Court
other Justices when a party seeks reversal of Fisher,
would
declare that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
incorporated the conception of witness as it was at the time of the founding.
The Court will hold that term "witness," at the time of the founding,
applied to anyone who gives evidence. Therefore, before a governmental
subpoena can trump a person's invocation of the privilege, the government
must immunize the person with use and derivative use immunity.
CONCLUSION

The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination serves as
262
the primary bulwark against prosecutors' power increasing indefinitely.
If personal documents lose protection, the resulting damage to our free
society would be devastating. America would become far more receptive to
a future totalitarian regime. Professor Jacob Stein, a former Independent
Counsel and a defense attorney, noted that "the only limits on prosecution
are budgetary. 2 63 This is problematic because, as former Watergate

258.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49-56.
259.
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
260.
Id. at 1356.
261.
See supra note 245.
262.
There is arguably an alternative protection for personal documents: "[T]he
Griswold right to privacy, based on penumbras emanating from the Fifth and other
amendments, may provide an arguable alternative protection for the contents of personal
documents." See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 416 (Brennan cites Griswold to support Fifth
Amendment protection of privacy); In re GrandJury Proceedings,632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d
Cir. 1980) (Third Circuit relies on Griswold to support Fifth Amendment protection of
privacy after Doe); LaVacca, supra note 181, at 415-17 (commentator asserts that Griswold
right to privacy should protect contents of personal diaries). Will, supra note 8, at 984.
263.
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prosecutor and defense attorney Sam Dash explained, close to 90 percent of
people surveyed confidentially admit to conduct that, if proven in a court of
law, could bring them jail time. 264 "It is not the honest against the crooked,
it is all of us," Dash said.2 65
Even if prosecuting every person who may have committed a crime
qualified as a worthy goal, such a goal would be impossible to meet. A
society that prosecuted each crime could not maintain itself. The lessons
learned from the totalitarian regimes in the former Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany should deter America from going down the path of ubiquitous
surveillance coupled with untrammeled governmental authority, despite
claims of emergency. Adolph Hitler seized power in Germany and started a
murderous and genocidal reign of terror using powers granted to the
German executive under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, a provision
which was set to only be invoked during an emergency. Under the
American Constitutional system, the prosecutor must carry the burden of
proving a charge against the accused. Prosecutors must not be allowed to
compel people to assist the government in fishing expeditions aimed at
seizing a person's personal papers as evidence to use them against them,266
regardless of whether this result comes from the proper application of the
context. 268
Fisher test 267 or from a revision of the privilege in historical
Without such a limit, innocence itself will be condemned as America turns
into a police state where law enforcement officials can examine any
person's personal papers with impunity. Founding Father John Adams
declared:
It is of more importance to [the] community that innocence
should be protected than it is that guilt should be punished,
for guilt and crimes are so frequent in the world that all of
them cannot be punished, and many times they happen in
such a manner that it is not of much consequence to the
public whether they are punished or not. But when
condemned...
innocence itself is brought to the bar and 269
there [is] an end to all security whatsoever.
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Sam Dash, Lecture at the Criminal Justice class at Georgetown University Law
264.
Center (Feb. 8, 2002).
Id.
265.
Cf, O'Neill, supra note 7.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra Part III (C-D).
See supra Part III (E).
JAMES S. KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? vii (Random House

20041

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PAPERS AND BOYD

Given this statement, Adams would be pleased if the modem Court
sided with the sentiment of the Boyd Court's holding that compulsory
production of personal papers are unconstitutional
because such searches
270
confound "the innocent ...with the guilty."

1983) (citing to 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zoebel, eds., 1965)).
270.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629.

